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Abstract. We propose a multiple pulses phase-matching quantum key distribution
protocol (MPPM-QKD) to exceed the linear key rate bound and to achieve higher
error tolerance. In our protocol, Alice and Bob generate at first their own train pulses
(each train should contain L pulses) as well as random bit sequences, and also encode
each pulse of their trains with a randomized phase and a modulation phase. As the
next step, both encoded trains are simultaneously sent to Charlie, who performs an
interference detection and may be also an eavesdropper. After a successful detection
is announced by Charlie, Alice and Bob open the randomized phase of each pulse and
keep only communications when the summation of the difference randomized phases at
two success detection’s time-stamps for Alice and Bob are equal to 0 or pi. Thereafter,
Alice and Bob compute the sifted key with the time-stamps.
The above procedure is repeated until both Alice and Bob achieve sufficiently long
sifted keys. We can also show that the secret key rate of the proposed QKD protocol
can beat the rate-loss limit of so far known QKD protocols when the transmission
distance is greater than 250 km. Moreover, the proposed protocol has a higher error
tolerance, approximately 24%, when the transmission distance is 50 km and L = 128.
The secret key rate and the transmission distance of our protocol are superior to that
of the round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol [6], and
also of the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol [4], and
the secret key rate performance is better in both cases than that of phase-matching
quantum key distribution when bit train length is greater than 32.
Keywords: Quantum key distribution, phase modulation, round-robin differential-phase-
shift, secret key rate
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols allow two distant parties (Alice and Bob)
to produce ad share a secret classical key even at the existence of an eavesdropper
(Eve) [1, 2]. In both theory and in experiments, QKD protocols are expected to be
more and more extensively applied in various practical situations [3–14]. However,
transmission losses of photons have become one of the major obstacles in practical
implementations of QKD protocol [15, 16].
Since the first QKD protocol (BB84) was proposed by Bennett et al. in 1984, a
variety of other QKD protocols have successively been presented. Unfortunately, a larger
application impact of these protocols was questioned because it was believed that the
key rate (R) of these protocols was bounded with respect to various the transmittance
parameters, [17–19], R ≤ O(η), where η is defined as the probability that a photon
can be successfully transmitted through the channel and being detected at the end
of the channel. Since no secure enough key could be distributed when transmitted
photons (carrying a quantum information in QKD protocols) are lost in the channel,
the transmittance η becomes a natural upper bound of the secret key rate without
trusted relay nodes [20].
Remarkably, Lucamarini et al. have recently proposed a novel phase-encoding
QKD protocol, called as the twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [9], to overcome current rate-
distance limits of QKD protocols, without quantum repeaters, and its security proof
was presented in Ref. [21]. Inspired by the original TF-QKD and its variants, a phase-
matching quantum key distribution (PM-QKD) protocol and also a ’sending or not
sending TF-QKD’ protocol, were subsequently proposed to overcome linear key rate
bound with relative phase encoding [22] and to tolerate a large misalignment error [23],
respectively. Later, a simplified TF-QKD protocol without the post-selection was
introduced and analyzed in [24]. By using vacuum and one-photon state as a qubit,
the TF-QKD could be seen as a measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [4]
with a single-photon Bell state measurement [25]. The physics behind TF-QKD is that
Alice and Bob prepare photon-number superposition remotely via coherent states and
post-selection.
In the PM-QKD protocol, Alice (Bob) prepare their weak coherent states |±√µ >
randomly and add a random phase φ(A)(φ(B)) to each of their weak coherent states.
Afterwards, they sent states to an untrusted party (Charlie) located somewhere in the
channel. Depending on the measurement performed by Charlie, Alice and Bob are able
to generate the raw key after a post-selection of the cases satisfying φ(A) ≈ φ(B). After
a sifting, parameter estimation and key distillation are necessary to be used to generate
a final private and secure key.
The signal disturbance caused by Eve’s intervention should be monitored to have
a bound on the potential information leakage. If an estimation of key parameters of
the protocol is required with high precision, the portion of the signal that had to be
sacrificed increases, and that decreases the efficiency of the protocol. However, T. Sasaki
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et al. in 2014 proposed in a round robin differential phase shift quantum key distribution
protocol [6], named RRDPS-QKD, how to obtain the secret key without the requirement
to do high precision estimation of many parameters. Since the proportion of information
an eavesdropper could have gained about the key can be known in advance, based on
the pre-set system parameters only, RRDPS-QKD not only simplifies the key generation
process but, more importantly, can lead to better noise tolerance [13, 14, 26].
In this paper, we propose a novel PM-QKD protocol without monitoring
the disturbance, named multiple pulses phase-matching quantum key distribution
protocol(MPPM-QKD). In this protocol, one L- pulse sequence (named ”train”) is
prepared by Alice (Bob), individually, which includes only one photon inside. Then,
Alice (Bob) randomizes each phase of one pulse in his (her) train and further encodes
the phase with 0, pi according to the two independent random L-bit sequences prepared
before. After that, Alice and Bob send encoded trains to Charlie (an eavesdropper), who
is expected to perform the interference detection. Charlie obtains successfully detection
when the clicks happen in exactly two time-stamps and announce time-stamps indices
(i, j) of two clicks to Alice and Bob. Afterward, Alice and Bob match phases of pulses
by a post-selection, and compute their sifted key by operations on the their own L-bit
sequences with the indices (i, j). After achieving sufficiently large sifted keys, Alice and
Bob obtain a secret key through reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the MPPM-QKD is
presented. In Section 3, the secret key rate performance of the proposed MPPM-QKD
is analyzed. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Multiple pulses phase-matching quantum key distribution protocol
Charlie
a b
c d
Alice
Laser
Bob
Laser
Figure 1: The schematic diagram of the proposed MPPM-QKD protocol.
In the section, we present our new MPPM-QKD protocol.
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Fig.1 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed MPPM-QKD protocol. In
MPPM-QKD protocol, two authorized users, Alice and Bob, generate two trains pulses
(each train contains L pulses) and two L-bit random bit-sequences kA = k
1
Ak
2
A · · · kLA ∈
{0, 1}⊗L and kB = k1Bk2B · · · kLB ∈ {0, 1}⊗L. Here, and in the following, the lower-case A
denotes Alice and the lower-case B represents Bob. They then perform a randomized
phase coding φA(B) ∈ [0, 2pi) and phase modulation on every pulse of their trains,
individually. The phase modulation rule is as follows: the encoding of the pulse phase
to 0 when kA(B) = 0 and an encoding of the pulse phase to pi when kA(B) = 1. After
that, both Alice and Bob send simultaneously their encoded trains to Charlie, who
may be an untrusted Eve, and is expected to perform the interference detection at
his side. After the interference detection has been carried out, Charlie announces the
success detection time-stamps (m,n), 0 ≤ m,n ≤ (L− 1). Observe that only two clicks
happened when the interference detection is defined as a success detection. After the
success detection, Alice and Bob open their randomized phase coding for each pulse.
Only when |φmA + φnB − φnA − φmB | = 0 or pi, Alice and Bob keep on communication,
and compute the sifted key with the success detection time-stamps. The procedures is
repeated until Alice and Bob obtain enough sifted keys.
The proposed protocol can be described in details as follows.
(i) Alice prepares her L-pulse train. (Here and in the following, ”L successive pulses”
will be used as the name of the train.) Alice then generates a L-bit random sequence
kA = k
1
Ak
2
A · · ·kLA ∈ {0, 1}⊗L. For the m-th pulse of the train (0 ≤ m ≤ (L − 1)),
Alice encodes a random phase φmA ∈ [0, 2pi) on the pulse, and applies the phase
modulation 0 (or pi) on the pulse according to the value of kmA . Similarly, Bob
prepares and encodes his L-pulse train the same way as Alice does. For his n-th
pulse, Bob randomly generates a random phase φnB ∈ [0, 2pi), and applies phase
modulation 0 (pi) according to knB value, where kB = k
1
Bk
2
B · · ·kLB ∈ {0, 1}⊗L. Let
us now consider a simple case where both Alice and Bob have exactly one photon
in their L-pulse trains. The states of the two photons can now be expressed by
1√
L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)aˆ+m | 0 >, (1)
1√
L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)bˆ+n | 0 > .
where i is an image unit i =
√
(−1). aˆ+m, bˆ+n are the creation operators on Alice’s
m-th and Bob’s n-th pulse at a’s and b’s paths in Fig.1, respectively.
(ii) Alice and Bob send their encoded trains to Charlie, who is expected to perform an
interference measurement and record detector’s clicks. Since there are two photons
in a block, one from Alice and one from Bob, Charlie obtains at most two detection
clicks. He then post-selects the block where there are exactly two clicks. A success
detection is now defined as wo clicks in the interference measurement. If there is
only one click, the detection result is discarded in the proposed protocol. After the
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interference and Charlie’s post-selection, the quantum state at the two detectors
become one of the four states,
(1 + cos(φmA + k
m
Api + φ
n
B + k
n
Bpi (2)
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi))c+mc+n | 0 >,
(1− cos(φmA + kmA pi + φnB + knBpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi))c+md+n | 0 >,
(1− cos(φmA + kmA pi + φnB + knBpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi))d+mc+n | 0 >,
(1 + cos(φmA + k
m
Api + φ
n
B + k
n
Bpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi))d+md+n | 0 > .
The detail is deduced in Appendix A. Here, cˆ+m and dˆ
+
m mean the creation operators
at m time-bin at c and d paths to the two detectors, respectively.
(iii) Charlie announces time-stamps (m,n) of two clicks when the interference
measurement detection is a success. After Charlie’s announcement, Alice and Bob
open their random phases of the corresponding pulses φmA , φ
n
A, φ
m
B , φ
n
B.
(iv) Only if |φmA + φnB − φnA − φmB | = 0 or pi, will Alice and Bob keep up communications.
Since kmA , k
n
B, k
n
A, k
m
B is ∈ {0, 1}, the value of |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | should be 0, 1 or
2. That is, |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | = 1 or |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | 6= 1.
Let us Consider now cases that |φmA + φnA − φmB − φnB| = 0. If |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | =
0 or 2, two considered clicks should be triggered by the same detector; Of course,
clicks should be triggered by different detectors when |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | = 1. If
two clicks are triggered by the same detector, kmA ⊕ knA then should be equal to
kmB ⊕ knB. Therefore, Alice and Bob would have their sifted key as sA = kmA ⊕ knA,
sB = k
m
B ⊕ knB. On the other hand, when both clicks are triggered by different
detectors, !(kmA ⊕ knA) is equal to kmB ⊕ knB, Alice and Bob could get in such a case
their sifted key as sA = k
m
A ⊕ knA, sB =!(kmB ⊕ knB).
Conversely, when |φmA + φnB − φnA − φmB | = pi, clicks are triggered by the same
detector when !(kmA ⊕ knA) = kmB ⊕ knB. Alice and Bob would get in such a case
sifted keys as sA = k
m
A ⊕knA, sB =!(kmB ⊕knB); Two clicks were triggered by different
detectors when kmA⊕knA = kmB⊕knB, Alice and Bob could compute in such a case their
sifted keys as sA = k
m
A ⊕ knA, sB = kmB ⊕ knB. (See the Appendix B for details.) This
way, Alice and Bob would obtain a sifted key without estimating signal disturbance
in quantum channels.
(v) Alice and Bob repeat steps (i)-(iv) several times until they have enough of sifted
keys. Afterwards, they perform an error correction and privacy amplification on
the sifted key bits to produce a fully secret key.
In the single photon case, it can be shown that Charlie, seen as an eavesdropper,
cannot distinguish whether the photon causing a click belongs to Alice or Bob when he
post-selects the block where the two clicks happen at m and n time-bins.
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Suppose that Alice’s photon is at m time-bin, Bob’s photon is at n time-bin.
Alice and Bob encode their key information (kmA , k
n
B) and randomize the pulse phases
(φmA , φ
n
B) on the m-th pulse and n-th pulse of their trains, respectively. Afterwards,
they send the encoded quantum states to Charlie who is expected to apply to it
an interference measurement and to announce whether |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | = 1 or
|kmA + knB − knA − kmB | 6= 1. Observe that there are sixteen possible output states that
could be sent to Charlie. We suppose now that |φmA + φnB − φnA − φmB | = 0 and that clicks
were triggered by different detectors, so that Charlie will get |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | = 1.
Unfortunately, Charlie can get only one of the eight possible output states from the
result |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | = 1. Here we describe them as | Ψ0,0,0,pi >, | Ψ0,0,pi,0 >,
| Ψ0,pi,0,0 >, | Ψ0,pi,pi,pi >, | Ψpi,0,0,0 >, | Ψpi,0,pi,pi >, | Ψpi,pi,0,pi >, | Ψpi,pi,pi,0 >. From these
results, Charlie cannot determine, in principle, whether phases encoded by Alice on her
m-th pulse and n-th pulse (or phases encoded by Bob on his m-th pulse and n-th pulse)
are 0 or pi. Thus, Charlie also can not get the final key as kE =!(k
m
A ⊕ knA) = kmB ⊕ knB.
In practice, a single-photon state source is often replaced by a weak laser pulse,
which can be described by a coherent state. That works as follows. Alice generates
a coherent state pulse, encodes her information and randomizes each pulse of the
train. The output quantum state is now 1√
L
∑L
m=1{ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)
∑+∞
k=0
√
e−µ µ
k
k!
| k >},
where k is the photon number and µ is the mean photon number or the light
intensity. Bob does the same state preparation as Alice. His quantum output state
is 1√
L
∑L
n=1{ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)
∑+∞
k=0
√
e−µ µ
k
k!
| k >}. When the phase is randomized, it can
be shown that the state of the whole train can be described by a statistical mixture
of Fock states, whose photon numbers follows a Poisson distribution. Similarly to the
single-photon case, Alice’s key information is encoded into the relative phases between
two pulses. Of course, it is possible to have multi-photons components in Alice and
Bob’s individual pulse trains, that inevitably effects Charlie’s post processing strategy.
If Charlie gets two or more detection clicks in a block, he could randomly choose the
two time stamps m and n and announce the time-bins (m,n) pairs to Alice and Bob.
Otherwise, he discards the result. In this way, Alice and Bob can figure out the phase
relationship between m and n as in the single photon case.
3. Secret key rate
In the section, we discuss the secret key rate of the proposed protocol.
We will also use the Gottesman-Lo-Lutkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) formula [28] for
the secret key rate derivations. It will be shown that the secret key rate is
R =
Qu
L
(1−HPA −HEC). (3)
where L stands for the length of pulses and HEC = f ·H(Eu) accounts for the cost of
an error correction and HPA = H(ep) stands for privacy amplification. In addition, Eu
denotes the bit error rate and ep the phase error rate, f is the error correction efficiency,
and H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function.
Multiple Pulses Phase-matching Quantum Key Distribution 7
For the weak coherent sources, the probability of photon numbers n for the quantum
state follows a Poisson distribution, that is,
Pn = e
−µµ
n
n!
. (4)
where n is the photon number and µ is the mean photon number or the light intensity.
In the simulation, the yield Yn and error rates en of the n-photon component are given
by [22],
Yn = 1− (1− 2Y0)(1− η)n, (5)
en =
Y0(1− η)n + ed[1− (1− η)n]
Yn
. (6)
where Y0 is the dark-count rate, η represents the overall transmittance of the system
and ed is the misalignment probability.
For the weak coherent source whose mean photon number or the light intensity is
µ, pulses total gain is Qu and the quantum bit error rate(QBER) Eu can be expressed
as
Qu =
∞∑
n=0
PnYn
=
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
[1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)n]
= 1− (1− 2pd)e−µη, (7)
Eu =
∞∑
n=0
PnenYn
=
∞∑
n=0
1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)n[pd(1− η)n + ed[1− (1− η)n]]
= ed + (pd − ed)e−µη. (8)
The detection click is classified as being of two types: a success detection and a
failing detection. Two clicks from the same detector at different times, and two clicks
from two detectors at different times, are considered as success detections. For a success
detection, the phase error rate can be calculated using the RRDPS-QKD protocol. We
will set vth as a threshold photon number for the source. The phase error rate will be
bounded by 1/2 when the mean photon number is greater than the threshold. Since
the phase error rate increases with the photon number, one can consider the worst case
scenario to be the case where the losses are all contributed from the lowest photon
numbers. For the quantum signal containing the mean photon number less than vth the
phase error rate will be bounded [27] by
ep =
e src
Qu
+ (1− e src
Qu
) ∗
1− (1− 2
(L−1))
vth
4
+
µη
2(1− µη) . (9)
where e src = P (n > vth) is the probability that the photon number is greater than the
threshold. Qu will be the gain of the experiment, η represents the overall transmittance
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of the system, µ will be the mean photon number. The phase error rate will be calculated
corresponding to the probability of more than vth photons: The probability of having
less than vth photons and the probability that two or more photons simultaneously enter
the same detector at the same time. Therefore, the final key generation formula of the
MPPM-QKD protocol is
R =
1
L
[Qu −Qu ∗ f ∗ h(Eu)−Qu ∗ h(ep)]. (10)
4. Simulation and Analysis
In this section, we deal with a numerical simulation of the secret key rate (SKR), and
compare the SKR performance of the proposed protocol with tat of MDI-QKD and
RRDPS-QKD protocols.
Table 1: Values of key parameters of our numerical simulation.
Y0 ηB ed f α/(dB/km)
10−9 × L 19% 1.5% 1.16 0.2
Key parameters of our numerical simulation are given in Table 1. Channels between
Alice and Charlie, as well as between Bob and Charlie, are supposed to be identical.
Fig. 2 shows secret key rates of the proposed MPPM-QKD protocol with respect
different transmission distances L, and comparing them with those of PM-QKD, MDI-
QKD, RRDPS-QKD protocols. From the figure one can see that the proposed MPPM-
QKD protocol is able to exceed the linear key rate bound when the transmission distance
is greater than 250 km. The longer the transmission distance is, the smaller the secret
key rate is. For the same transmission distance, the longer train is, the higher the secret
secret key rate is.
When compared with the PM-QKD protocol, MPPM-QKD protocol can be used
for a longer transmission distance when L is greater than 32. In comparison with the
MDI-QKD protocol, MPPM-QKD protocol can function well at longer transmission
distance and a higher secret key rate. In addition, MPPM-QKD protocol has a better
performance in comparison with RRDPS-QKD protocol for the same time length L. For
the key rate R = 10−8 and L = 16, the longest practical transmission distance of the
MPPM-QKD protocol reliability is approaching 400 km, whereas MDI-QKD protocol
has it lower than 200 km and the RRDPS-QKD is upper bounded by 100 km. Moreover,
the key rate is increased by 2 ∼ 4 orders of magnitude when the transmission distance
is 200 km,
Fig.3 shows the secret secret key rate of the MPPM-QKD protocol versus the bit
error rate, together with those performances of PM-QKD and RRDPS-QKD protocols,
when the transmission distances were setup to 50km and 100km. Fig.3(a) shows the
comparison with the PM-QKD protocol, while Fig.3(b) shows the comparison with the
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Figure 2: Secret key rate of the proposed MPPM-QKD protocol for different
transmission distances L, compared with those for PM-QKD, MDI-QKD, RRDPS-QKD
protocols.
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Figure 3: Key generatin rates of the MPPM-QKD, PM-QKD and RRDPS-QKD
protocols versus bit error rates.
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RRDPS-QKD protocol. From the figure, we can see that the secret secret key rate
decrease with the increase of the bit error rate. When L = 128, the performance of
MPPM-QKD protocol was better than that of PM-QKD. When compared with the
RRDPS-QKD protocol, MPPM-QKD protocol has a better secret key rate with the
same bit error rate, same transmission distance, and the same train length. When the
transmission distance is 50 km and L = 128, the highest bit error rate of the MPPM-
QKD protocol is approximately 24%, which is higher than 18% that is the highest bit
error rate of the RRDPS-QKD protocol.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a new MPPM-QKD protocol, which has the advantages
comparing with MP-QKD and RRDPS-QKD protocols. The proposed QKD protocol
can exceed the linear key rate bound in general QKD protocols like MP-QKD, and does
not monitor signal disturbance in the used quantum channel. The numerical results have
demonstrated that our MPPM-QKD protocol not only have exceeded the well-known
rate-loss limit of known QKD protocols, but have also a better performance on secrecy
of the secret key rate and also concerning transmission distance at which it can be used.
The proposed MPPM-QKD protocol has a better secret key generation performance
also in comparison with the RRDPS-QKD protocol for the same train length L, and
have achieved a longer usable transmission distance when the length of train L is greater
than 32 in comparison with the MP-QKD protocol. In comparison with RRDPS-QKD,
MPPM-QKD protocols it has also a higher error tolerance. The transmission distance
of the proposed MPPM-QKD protocol approaches 450 km when the secret key rate R
has been 10−8, and the usable length L has been 128. The secret key rate has increased
by two-three orders of magnitude, compared with those of the RRDPS-QKD protocol
and MDI-QKD protocol, when the transmission distance has been set up to 200km.
Moreover, the highest bit error rate has been approximate 25% when the transmission
distance has been 50 km and L = 128.
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Appendix A
The quantum states of Alice and Bob are given by
1√
L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)aˆ+m | 0 >,
1√
L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)bˆ+n | 0 > . (A11)
respectively, where aˆ+m, bˆ
+
m are the creation operator of Alice’s and Bob’s m-th position
at a and b paths, respectively, as shown in Fig.1. After the interference by the beam
splitter which replaces aˆ+m by (cˆ
+
m+ dˆ
+
m)/
√
2 and bˆ+n by (cˆ
+
m− dˆ+n )/
√
2, the output result
becomes
(
1√
L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)aˆ+m)(
1√
L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)bˆ+n )
= (
1√
2L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)(cˆ+m + dˆ
+
m))(
1√
2L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)(cˆ+n − dˆ+n ))
= (
1√
2L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)cˆ+m +
1√
2L
L∑
m=1
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi)dˆ+m)(
1√
2L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)cˆ+n
− 1√
2L
L∑
n=1
ei(φ
n
B
+kn
B
pi)dˆ+n ) (A12)
= ei(φ
1
A
+k1
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)cˆ+1 cˆ
+
1 + ... + e
i(φ1
A
+k1
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+1 cˆ
+
L
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−ei(φ1A+k1Api+φ1B+k1Bpi)cˆ+1 dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
1
A
+k1
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+1 dˆ
+
L
+ei(φ
2
A
+k2
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)cˆ+2 cˆ
+
1 + ...+ e
i(φ2
A
+k2
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+2 cˆ
+
L
−ei(φ2A+k2Api+φ1B+k1Bpi)cˆ+2 dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
2
A
+k2
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+2 dˆ
+
L
+...
+ei(φ
L
A
+kL
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)cˆ+L cˆ
+
1 + ...+ e
i(φL
A
+kL
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+L cˆ
+
L
−ei(φLA+kLApi+φ1B+k1Bpi)cˆ+L dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
L
A
+kL
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)cˆ+L dˆ
+
L
+ei(φ
1
A
+k1
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)dˆ+1 cˆ
+
1 + ... + e
i(φ1
A
+k1
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+1 cˆ
+
L
−ei(φ1A+k1Api+φ1B+k1Bpi)dˆ+1 dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
1
A
+k1
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+1 dˆ
+
L
+ei(φ
2
A
+k2
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)dˆ+2 cˆ
+
1 + ... + e
i(φ2
A
+k2
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+2 cˆ
+
L
−ei(φ2A+k2Api+φ1B+k1Bpi)dˆ+2 dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
2
A
+k2
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+2 dˆ
+
L
+...
+ei(φ
L
A
+kL
A
pi+φ1
B
+k1
B
pi)dˆ+L cˆ
+
1 + ... + e
i(φL
A
+kL
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+L cˆ
+
L
−ei(φLA+kLApi+φ1B+k1Bpi)dˆ+L dˆ+1 − ...− ei(φ
L
A
+kL
A
pi+φL
B
+kL
B
pi)dˆ+L dˆ
+
L
=
1
2L
∑
1≤m≤L
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi+φm
B
+km
B
pi)cˆ+mcˆ
+
m +
1
2L
∑
1≤m≤L
ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi+φm
B
+km
B
pi)dˆ+mdˆ
+
m
+
1
2L
∑
1≤m<n≤L
(ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi+φn
B
+kn
B
pi) + ei(φ
n
A
+kn
A
pi+φm
B
+km
B
pi))cˆ+mcˆ
+
n
− 1
2L
∑
1≤m<n≤L
(ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi+φn
B
+kn
B
pi) + ei(φ
n
A
+kn
A
pi+φm
B
+km
B
pi))dˆ+mdˆ
+
n
+
1
2L
∑
1≤m<n≤L
(−ei(φmA+kmA pi+φnB+knBpi) + ei(φnA+knApi+φmB+kmB pi))cˆ+mdˆ+n
+
1
2L
∑
1≤m<n≤L
(ei(φ
m
A
+km
A
pi+φn
B
+kn
B
pi) − ei(φnA+knApi+φmB+kmB pi))dˆ+mcˆ+n
There are 6 items in the output result, and only the last four items are kept, since
the detection results are discarded when there is only one click in the detectors. The
four items’ probabilities are,
P (c+mc
+
n ) =< c
+
mc
+
n | c+mc+n >= 1 + cos(φmA + kmA pi + φnB + knBpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi)
P (c+md
+
n ) =< c
+
md
+
n | c+md+n >= 1− cos(φmA + kmApi + φnB + knBpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi)
P (d+mc
+
n ) =< d
+
mc
+
n | d+mc+n >= 1− cos(φmA + kmApi + φnB + knBpi (A13)
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi)
P (d+md
+
n ) =< d
+
md
+
n | d+md+n >= 1 + cos(φmA + kmA pi + φnB + knBpi
−φnA − knApi − φmB − kmB pi)
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Table B2: The results of detectors and the sifted key of Alice and Bob.
Alice Code Bob Code
kmA k
n
A k
m
B k
n
B |kmA + knB − knA − kmB | Detector results sA sB
0 0 0 0 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 0 kmB ⊕ knB = 0
0 0 0 1 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 0 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 0
0 0 1 0 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 0 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 0
0 0 1 1 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 0 kmB ⊕ knB = 0
0 1 0 0 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 1 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 1
0 1 0 1 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 1 kmB ⊕ knB = 1
0 1 1 0 2 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 1 kmB ⊕ knB = 1
0 1 1 1 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 1 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 1
1 0 0 0 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 1 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 1
1 0 0 1 2 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 1 kmB ⊕ knB = 1
1 0 1 0 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 1 kmB ⊕ knB = 1
1 0 1 1 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 1 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 1
1 1 0 0 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 0 kmB ⊕ knB = 0
1 1 0 1 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 0 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 0
1 1 1 0 1 DIFF kmA ⊕ knA = 0 !(kmB ⊕ knB) = 0
1 1 1 1 0 SAME kmA ⊕ knA = 0 kmB ⊕ knB = 0
Appendix B
Here the detector results and the sifted key for Alice(Bob) when |φmA + φnB − φnA − φmB | =
0 are listed in Table App. B. The detector results are divided into two types, denoted
as SAME which represents the two clicks are triggered by the same detector, and DIFF
which represents the two clicks are triggered by different detectors.
